In the wake of Citizens United, political action committees (PACs) face new sources of competition from super PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations and 501(c)6 professional associations for both donor contributions and electoral influence. Using itemized and summary committee files from the U.S. Federal Election Commission, I investigate factors that predict PACs' fundraising success between 2008 and 2014 and I examine the impact of PAC contributions on House candidates' vote margins since 1992. While I uncover evidence of PAC fundraising challenges that may relate to growing competition from other groups, I also find PAC contributions to House candidates have increased in importance. Taken together, the results suggest PACs continue to occupy a vital niche in campaign financing.
Political action committees (PACs) constitute the second largest source of campaign money in congressional races (Herrnson 2012 ). Yet as a consequence of the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United sanctioning the ability of independent expenditure only groupsprimarily super PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, 501(c)5 unions, and 501(c)6
professional associations-to raise and spend money in unlimited amounts to influence federal elections (Smith and Powell 2013; La Raja 2014; 558 U.S. 310, 2010) , PACs face new sources of competition for both donors' dollars and electoral influence. Additionally, Citizens United created an asymmetric regulatory regime in which PACs, unlike the aforementioned groups, remain subject to constraints on their fundraising as well as a set of reporting requirements that 501(c)4, 5 and 6 organizations can largely avoid and super PACs can skirt in some instances.
While PACs remain the only interest group organizations that are able to contribute funds directly to federal candidates and while they now have a legal option to maintain their own soft money independent expenditure accounts, legal restrictions on their fundraising may hamper their ability to influence federal elections to the same extent as the less fettered super PAC and 501(c)4, 5 and 6 organizations. And although many interest groups now maintain a PAC along with a super PAC or even a related 501(c)4 social welfare organization, the question remains as to whether PACs' fundraising and related influence in elections have been affected because of these developments.
As the creations of the amended Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA), for many years PACs remained the only vehicles for interest groups to raise and spend money to influence federal elections (Magleby and Goodliffe 2014) . Since the implementation of FECA, PACs must report all of their activities to the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC). From a democratic perspective, they are ideal because they operate in relative transparency. And although they contribute money to federal candidates to gain influence over both election outcomes and elected officials' behavior in office, their ability to disproportionately influence elected officials is curbed by legal contribution limits on fundraising and giving. While these features now place them at a fundraising disadvantage relative to other groups, they are advantageous with respect to the maintenance of democratic elections and representation. If super PACs and 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 organizations eventually supplant PACs, there will be even less transparency in campaign finance. Moreover, candidate campaigns will lose an important source of hard dollar funding that they now need more than ever to maintain their own spending in elections in which super PACs, 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, and 501(c)6 professional associations now dominate and in which candidates' parties face similar handicaps to federal PACs under the remaining components of campaign finance laws (La Raja and Schaffner 2015) .
This study investigates the fundraising capacity of PACs relative to other interest group vehicles and the impact of PACs' financial support of House candidates overtime. First, I
examine the determinates of PAC fundraising because so little is known about what leads donors to contribute to one PAC versus another. I test whether federal PAC contributions from individual donors are dependent upon the PACs' connections to affiliated groups, the PAC's prominence in the media, the PAC's connections to a party network, the PAC's ability to raise soft money in congressional races, among other characteristics predictive of a PAC's fundraising success. I also examine changes in these characteristics overtime and look for indications of rising competitive pressures on PACs' fundraising. Second, using a matching analysis, I
investigate whether PAC contributions to House candidates have the same, lesser, or greater impact on House candidates' vote margins before and after the changes in campaign finance law introduced by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (pre-BCRA and post-BCRA eras) and subsequent Supreme Court rulings. The most important advantage PACs retain is their singular ability among interest group vehicles to contribute directly to candidates. Given that parties face fundraising constraints, there is reason to expect congressional candidates have become more dependent upon direct hard dollar contributions from PACs (La Raja and Schaffner 2015) . Thus, an examination of whether the impact of PAC support has changed is critical for determining changes in their influence relative to other groups and their influence relative to political parties-which serve as the other primary vehicle for channeling hard dollars to candidates. Third, I examine a variety of descriptive statistics as well as the average cost per dollar raised overtime for evidence of rising fundraising competition between PACs and super PACs.
The results suggest PACs face new sources of financial competition but have done well by raising record amounts of hard dollars. I also uncover evidence that PAC contributions are more important than ever to the campaigns of non-incumbent and incumbent House candidates in the post-BCRA era. The analyses suggest PACs continue to occupy an important niche in campaign financing.
Regulations, PAC Fundraising, and Electoral Impact
Although PACs' greatest advantage stills lies in their ability to provide funds directly to federal candidates, those funds must be collected from individuals and other political groups in legally limited amounts. Using those hard dollar receipts, PACs may only contribute a maximum of $5,000 to each federal candidate per calendar year (Herrnson 2012) . While many PACs bundle individual donor contributions to receive credit for raising the funds they distribute to campaigns and other political groups thereby circumventing their own direct contribution limit, they must still collect those funds in legally limited increments (Marshall 1997 )-those limits range from $2,300 per election in 2008 to $2,600 per election in 2014 as the rates are subject to adjustments for inflation. In contrast, super PACs, and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, 501(c)5 unions, and 501(c)6 professional associations can raise unlimited amounts of money so long as their expenditures are made independently from candidate campaigns (Taylor and Holman 2010; Smith and Powell 2013) . With respect to fundraising, these groups can approach a single donor for a donation of any size. In 2014, they raised an average reported contribution of $15,323.
PACs must also report all of their financial activity, including individual receipts over $200, and all of their expenditures, including general operating expenditures, to the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC). Super PACs must register with the FEC and are subject to the same disclosure requirements as other committees (Smith and Powell 2013) . 501(c)4,5 and 6 groups are required to report electioneering communications, which are advertisements that could be reasonably interpreted to be express advocacy for or against a federal candidate (even if specific advocacy language is avoided) within 30 days of a primary or within 60 days of a general election, to the FEC (Taylor and Holman 2010; Barker 2012 Masters and Baysinger (1985) provide the most comprehensive study to date. Using a two-stage regression model, on the one hand, they investigate whether PACs connected to corporations with larger numbers of employees, assets, profits, and a history of PAC activity in previous election cycles (modeled as dummies for those cycles) are able to raise more money overall. In the second stage, they also analyze whether industry concentration, the percentage of unions in the firms' industries, the percentage of product purchases by the federal government, and the degree of industry regulation impact PAC fundraising outcomes. They find the firm's assets, profits, size, and PAC history all positively increased the PAC's receipts as do unionization, the degree of regulation, and the federal government's purchases of industry goods and services.
As suggested by Masters and Baysinger (1985) , the PAC's fundraising capacity rests largely upon its donor base-in their study, connected PACs linked to corporations with more employees raised more money. Consequently, PACs with ideological membership bases, such as the National Rifle Association and EMILY's List, and built-in membership bases, such as unions and professional associations, should enjoy greater fundraising advantages (Rozell, Wilcox and Madland 2006) . On the other hand, Eismeier and Pollock (1985) point out that PACs "need and get less commitment and participation from 'members'" than other types of organizations (193).
Although few political science studies examine PAC donor characteristics (see Francia, Herrnson, Powell and Wilcox 2003; Sorauf 1984 for exceptions) , "what evidence there is suggests low engagement" (Eismeir and Pollock 1985, 195) . Of course, engagement may vary with the organization's prominence and apparent effectiveness. In interviews with PAC managers, Eismeir and Pollock (1985) found PAC donors care about the PAC's record of making a decisive difference in close congressional races and in backing winning candidates.
Thus, the PAC's candidate support and its reputation may also factor into its fundraising success.
Finally, there is evidence a PAC's connection to other interest groups and to the major parties can impact this success. Baker (2014) demonstrates there is a multiplier effect associated with PAC contributions to congressional candidates in which parties and allied PACs work together to channel contributions to important races-although the degree to which parties shepherded PAC funds to candidate campaigns declined in the post-BCRA era as parties shifted their spending strategies to target fewer races, devoted more resources to independent spending, and increased spending late in the election cycle (Baker 2014) . (Biersack and Viray 2005) . While a single PAC contribution is unlikely to have much of an effect because it is limited to $5,000 per election (the primary and general count as separate elections), the sum of PAC contributions that make up the candidate's campaign treasury not only suggests the candidate boasts a solid fundraising base, particularly if that candidate is a non-incumbent, but also suggests that candidate is connected to a broader network of donors (Herrnson 2012) . Additionally, hard dollar contributions are still a sought-after resource in federal elections.
PACs' Unique Niche in Campaign Financing
The primary advantage that PACs retain in the post-BCRA era is the same advantage they had in the pre-BCRA era, namely their ability to contribute money directly to federal campaigns. Federal candidates continue to rely upon this money to get elected and they can only accept hard dollar contributions under campaign finance law. For this reason, I hypothesize the degree to which the PAC is involved in federal races and the number of races the PAC typically supports might be factors that draw donors to contribute (see also Eismeir and Pollock 1985 above). Although in contrast to the limited hard dollar support PACs can provide, super PACs and 501(c)organizations (IE groups) can spend unlimited amounts of money independently in support of or in opposition to candidate campaigns, the utility of these funds for candidate campaigns is suspect (Baker 2015a; La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Malbin and Glavin 2018) . La Raja and Schaffner (2015) point out that "decisions about the use of the marginal dollar cannot be made when campaign organizations are legally cordoned off from one another and each IE group has already allocated its money to be spent on a particular activity" (130). They go on to argue "the emphasis on IEs entails an emphasis on TV" rather than "grassroots efforts" (130), which are central to campaign success. As a consequence, I do not expect PACs' status as a Carey PAC will increase their success in raising hard dollar from donors. Donors hoping to provide support that goes directly to candidates will contribute to PACs or candidates. Donors wishing to engage in independent spending will give elsewhere.
Additionally , Aside from PACs, political party organizations are the only other financing vehicle that can engage in hard dollar contributing. La Raja and Schaffner (2015) theorize legal constraints on parties' financing post-BCRA have led candidates to rely upon other sources of funds particularly those supplied through "policy-demanding" interest groups (90). And they argue changes in the law that incentivized independent spending have also shifted power dynamics within party coalitions providing an upper hand to ideological purists who are more likely to engage in independent spending because they do not fear public backlash for their views (128).
Hence IE groups allow purists to avoid the "moderating mediation of the party organizations"
.
In addition to advantaging super PACs and other IE groups, weakening party influence could also elevate the importance of PAC support for candidates particularly as politics becomes more polarized and more moderate candidates fail to win seats in Congress (La Raja and Schaffner 2015). As La Raja and Schaffner (2015) argue, legal "constraints on parties enable partisan interest groups to assume a large and less constrained role in elections" (5). There is also evidence that the alliances between parties and allied PACs weakened between the pre- However, independent expenditures against the candidate rather than against the candidate's opponent are also coupled with each candidate's identification number. Thus, in order to determine which independent expenditures were made against the candidate's opponent thereby helping the candidate in question, it was necessary to reorganize the data. The covariates used for analysis are subsequently the independent expenditures by parties or interest groups conversely, that were made in support of the candidate combined with the independent expenditures made by parties or interest groups against the candidate's opponent in the race. The party and interest group independent expenditures covariates are separate totals. Finally, the candidate's total disbursements are also included as previous studies suggest candidate expenditures may affect whether the campaign is successful or not (Gerber, 1998; Green & Krasno 1988) Incumbents are matched according to their seniority, political party (Republican), a dummy variable representing Rothenberg's rating of their race as competitive or not, the Democratic presidential vote in their district, and whether they face a quality challenger or not.
Their total individual contributions and party contributions (direct and coordinated) as well as party independent expenditures and total independent expenditures by other groups (as above) are used as separate covariates in the matching process. Lastly, incumbents' total disbursements are also utilized to make matches.
To compare PAC and super PACs fundraising 2 , I examine their sources of revenue in constant 2008 dollars in Figure 1 . All data are gleaned from the FEC's summary and itemized committee contribution files. I also analyze the cost per dollar raised overtime for both PACs and super PACs in Figure 2 . These calculations were made using the FEC's operating expenditure files and total receipts from the committee summary files (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . As PACs and super PACs do not consistently apply the codes for fundraising that are requested but not required by the FEC, it was necessary to review the operating files on a line item basis using the descriptions for each line item as well as the vendors to determine which line items constituted fundraising costs. A discussion of the elimination process can be found in the Appendix.
Results
The results of the PAC fundraising models are displayed in Table 1 <Insert Table 1 about here> The PAC's ties to the party only significantly increases fundraising in 2010. In that year, a PAC, which contributed to at least one of the parties' national committees (and not to committees of both parties), is predicted on average to enjoy an additional $169,100 in revenue from donors. This result suggests the alliances between PACs and parties are likely better reflected in their mutual support of congressional candidates more so than monetary support of one another. Previous work suggests parties played an important role in terms of channeling PAC money to important congressional races in the pre-BCRA era but that role diminished in the post-BCRA era with changes in campaign finance laws that led to the rise of party independent spending and the dominance of purists within party coalitions (Baker 2014; La Raja and Schaffner, 2015 
Matching Analysis: PAC Contributions and Candidates' Electoral Competitiveness
The results of the matching analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . In the first matched set featuring non-incumbent House candidates competing in the pre-BCRA era, there is considerable improvement in the L1 statistic between the auto baseline and user-coarsened models. L1 decreases from 0.882 to 0.683. Although the match rate is not an improvement over the baseline model, the total number of matched cases for analysis is still over 1,000 and the L1 statistic suggests a high degree of balance between the treatment and control groups has been achieved. In the post-BCRA set of non-incumbent House candidates, there is also a major decline in the L1 statistic from 0.826 to 0.650 suggesting greater balance has been achieved.
Additionally, the match rate of the user-coarsened model actually improves upon the match rate for the baseline model: 56 cases are added to the treatment group. Greater variation in the covariates among non-incumbent House candidates facilitated the construction of these matched sets for both time periods. Unfortunately, incumbent candidates are much more similar to one another-for instance, only 12 percent of them are classified as vulnerable in the 1992-2002 dataset and only 8 percent of them fall into this category in the 2004-2014 dataset. As a consequence, it can be slightly harder to cluster them into meaningful groups for comparison resulting in the marginal improvements that are observable between the auto-baseline and user coarsened models in pre-BCRA era models in Table 3 . There is a small improvement in the L1 statistic but even this small decrease this was only achieved by sacrificing the number of matched cases. Five hundred thirty-four additional cases in the control group and one hundred seventy cases in the treatment group are unmatched between the auto-baseline and usercoarsened models. The post-BCRA era proved to be better for identifying quality matches. The L1 statistic decreases from 0.982 to 0.796. Although the number of unmatched cases increased between the auto-baseline and user-coarsened models by 459 in the control group and 172 in the treatment group, the sample that is retained for analysis remains over 1,000.
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> After the matching process, a simple OLS regression tests the effect of the treatmentabove median PAC support-on the House candidate's vote margin. The results of both regressions are at the bottom of Tables 2 and 3. In the pre-BCRA era, non-incumbents contesting in House races are estimated to gain 3.59 percentage points on their vote margin with PAC support above the median amount of support given during that time period (see Table 2 ).
However, House incumbents are not predicted to receive any significant gains (see Table 3 ). In the post-BCRA era, on average non-incumbent House candidates are predicted to receive a 6.81 percent gain in their margins with the receipt of above median PAC support (see Table 2) whereas House incumbents are expected to see a 2.48 percent increase (see Table 3 ). For both sets of candidates, the positive impact of PAC support increases between the two time periods suggesting PAC contributions play a larger role in candidate success in the post-BCRA era.
The differences that are uncovered for incumbents and non-incumbents are in keeping with previous studies which find incumbent spending to be less effective in terms of altering election outcomes than challengers' spending (Jacobson 1978 (Jacobson , 1985 Abramowitz 1988 ).
Spending and fundraising abilities after all are closely connected. While incumbents are more dependent upon PAC funds, they have less need of additional funds in general due to sizable campaign war chests (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Goodliffe 2005; Herrson 2012). As a consequence, every additional dollar is likely to provide a lower marginal return. Thus, it makes sense that the returns to challengers and open-seat candidates, who can marginally benefit greatly from additional PAC support, would be higher.
Revenue and Fundraising Costs
With respect to revenue generation, PACs have performed well since the Citizens United ruling in 2010. In Figure 1 , it is clear that in 2012 they were able to raise over $2. running in the pre-BCRA time period, the increase for an average candidate's vote margin was predicted to be 3.59 percent whereas in the post-BCRA era the predicted increase rose to 6.8 percent. The findings of the first fundraising analysis echo these results. In Table 1 importance as parties' role in elections has been curbed. As they argue, "when resources for party organizations are reduced, influence moves away from pragmatists within party organizations toward the purist factions operating through policy-demanding organizations" (90).
Although ideological purists are also predicted to utilize super PACs and 501(c)organizations to gain more influence in elections (La Raja and Schaffner 2015) , it is reasonable to assume PACs' relevance would also increase as purists gain more influence within the party coalitions.
Additionally, parties have shifted their spending tactics in order to compete in the new interest group dominated environment in the post-BCRA era (Baker 2014 Hard dollar contributions, unlike independent expenditures, provide the candidate's campaign with control over how the funds get spent (La Raja and Schaffner 2015). As super PACs and 501(c)4 and 6 groups become the dominant spenders in congressional elections, particularly on advertising, candidates are more reliant upon hard dollar fundraising to ensure they are able to spend money to rely their own messages to voters. Additionally, PAC contributions are often accompanied by public endorsements of the candidate, which have been shown to increase contributions to non-incumbent House candidates from donors (Baker 2015b ).
Many PACs also engage in other support activities such as informing their membership about the candidate and generally promoting the candidate on their websites and in other public communications (Baker 2015b; La Raja and Schaffner 2015) . These are activities in which super
PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations (although not 501(c)5 unions and 501(c)6
professional associations) minimally engage in part because most lack established reputations and membership bases that are needed for effective endorsements and mobilization. And legally, they cannot appear to be or actually be coordinating with the campaign if they are spending independently to support the candidate or to oppose the candidate's opponent.
Despite new sources of competition from super PACs and 501(c)4,5 and 6 groups for campaign contributions and electoral influence, PACs continue to play an important and specialized role in electoral politics. As long as direct contributions to candidates remain limited by law both in amount and by their source, PACs will occupy this vital niche. Their strategic relevance to election financing may diminish overtime as independent expenditures by super PACs and 501(c)4 and 6 groups flood the electoral process but it will certainly not disappear unless the Supreme Court says otherwise. While PACs are no longer the sole vehicle for infusing interest group money into federal elections, they are an important source of financial support for federal candidates and this continues to provide them with a major advantage. They also represent a transparent and legitimate vehicle for interest group influence that helps maintain the integrity of the democratic elections. 
